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La police du Sud-ouest africain allemand (Namibie), composée d’environ
500 anciens sous-officiers allemands et 370 policiers africains, ne fut
formellement créée qu’en 1905. Ses fonctions étaient analogues à celles de la
police en Allemagne: maintenir l’ordre et la tranquillité publique et réprimer
la délinquance. Les policiers coloniaux devaient également appliquer les
«règlements indigènes» (Eingeborenen Verordnungen) de 1907, qui régis-
saient le port des cartes d’identité pour les Africains, ainsi que leurs obliga-
tions de travail et d’enregistrement auprès des autorités locales. L’effectivité
de ce contrôle était cependant limitée, comme le montrèrent les vaines tenta-
tives policières pour mettre un terme aux vols de bétail et autres formes de
brigandage. En outre, ces policiers avaient du mal à communiquer avec la
population et devaient recourir à des interprètes locaux dont la fiabilité leur
était suspecte. Afin d’obvier cette difficulté, les policiers allemands furent
requis d’apprendre une langue locale, mais cette obligation souleva de nom-
breuses difficultés et leurs efforts ne rencontrèrent qu’un succès très limité.
Being only formally founded in 1905, the police force of GSWA (consist-
ing of roughly 500 former German NCOs and 370 African policemen) had
duties similar to those of the police within Germany: to secure public order
and the public’s welfare, as well as to penalise perpetrators. In addition to
these duties, colonial police officers also had to execute the so-called «native
regulations» of 1907 (Eingeborenen-Verordnungen), which regulated the
carrying of official passes by Africans, as well as their obligation to work and
to be registered with the local administration. The actual ability of the colo-
nial police force to exert control over the colonial territory was limited how-
ever, as futile attempts to bring an end to cattle theft and other forms of ban-
ditry were to demonstrate. Communication with the local population also
proved to be a problem for these officers, with officials forced to refer to
African interpreters whose reliability they questioned. In an attempt to cir-
cumvent this issue, German policemen were requested to learn an African
language. In this the colonial police force would encounter many problems
however, with their attempts producing only meagre results.
1 Jakob Zollmann studied history and law in Berlin, Paris and San Francisco. He works as a legal
consultant and is author of a book on the colonial police force in GSWA: Koloniale Herrschaft und
ihre Grenzen : Die Kolonialpolizei in Deutsch-Südwestafrika 1894-1915, Göttingen, Vandenhoeck
& Ruprecht, 2010.
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INTRODUCTION
At the end of the 19
th century, colonial administrators began to introduce the
policing duties and practices (for example regulating, punishing, informing
and recording) that had evolved in Europe over the course of centuries to their colo-
nial territories. These duties and practices were accepted as being necessary police
functions in the maintenance of law and order within a (colonial) state, especially in
those territories whose communities of settlers were growing. Furthermore, the
accompanying division of colonial forces into military and police wings was not just
a mere formality: it signalled the more rooted, stabilised, and indeed more ‘nor-
malised’ status of colonial power. It was in this context that Britain organized the
Gold Coast Armed Police in 18652. The German colonial empire was no exception
to these developments.
Germany did not acquire colonies before 1884/5, and these acquisitions in
Africa and the South Seas were at first barely touched by their new ‘masters’. His-
torians talk of a “‘paper occupation’ of Africa” during the course of the Berlin
Africa Conference3, and indeed a few engagements by one or two navy vessels off
the coastline were all the German government initially afforded with regard to their
new overseas possessions. Chancellor Otto v. Bismarck was reluctant when it came
to the expensive deployment of troops in Germany’s African territories, which
(according to his plans) should not have been “colonies” proper, but instead protec-
torates (Schutzgebiete) : territories administered privately by “British style” char-
tered companies4. His plans proved futile however, and so did hopes for Africans
willingly accepting German “protection” – increasing ‘riots’ led to the deployment
of more troops. Even with these increases, the numbers of men employed were still
to remain small : in 1890, for instance, only 190 German troopers and 1530 Africans
were deployed in German East Africa [now Tansania]. In 1893, only 220 men were
deployed to German South-West-Africa [GSWA, now Namibia], in an effort to sub-
due the Ovaherero and Nama. Perhaps unsurprisingly given the number of troops
deployed, it would ultimately be political machinations, rather than German military
might, that would lead to the signing of “protection treaties” by African leaders like
Samuel Maharero of Okahandja, or Hendrik Witbooi of Gibeon5.
It would only be in 1894, a full ten years after the tradesman Adolf Lüderitz had
originally requested protection from the German Empire for his ‘possessions’ along
the coastline of south western Africa, that some invalid German troopers as well as
a few Africans would be seconded as policemen to the colonial capital Windhoek,
as well as in the towns of Swakopmund and Keetmanshoop. Assigned to act as
clerks for the local administration, they were tasked with helping control the grow-
ing ‘urban population’ of settlers and Africans as well as the farm areas.
Establishing a colonial (police) force was merely one aspect of German colonial
policy however. The aims of the German colonial mission were manifold: apart
from economic objectives, colonial missions claimed to be civilizing missions,
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bringing order into chaos6. Colonial possessions «were meant to, at least in some
respects, evolve into something resembling a state»7. Irrespective of any discussion
about colonies being used as “laboratories”8, the intention to establish a state-like
order according to European patterns, including taxes, military, police, prisons,
schools and infrastructure, was unmistakable. The question of how to reach these
objectives remained open for contemporaries however: the resulting “colonial per-
plexity” of Europeans in Africa is to be emphasised9.
By examining German efforts to regulate, control and communicate colonial
order, the following analysis of attempts to police GSWA exemplifies this “colonial
perplexity”. The first part of this analysis, focusing on regulation and personnel, out-
lines: 1) how the legal and administrative framework of colonial policing was orga-
nized in GSWA; 2) how contemporaries dealt with, and how researchers have
assessed, the effectiveness and/or impotence of German colonial rule; and 3) why
the involvement of African personnel was indispensable for German colonial rule.
The second part of this analysis puts an emphasis on colonial policing practices,
exemplified by: 1) police patrols and 2) the interaction between police and the
African population after the “native regulations” were enacted in 1907. In the third
part of this study, the focus shall be on the languages used to communicate between
Africans and German policemen in GSWA, in order to analyse: 1) the inadequacy of
interpreters for colonial purposes; and 2) how German officials could be turned into
African language students.
Over the last decades, such questions on the policing of German Africa have
been, by and large, neglected in German historiography. Whereas considerable
research on the policing of the British Empire has been undertaken, no comparable
literature is available for the German colonies. The gaps that were left by the few
authors who have worked in that field since the 1960s – the most notable of these
being Helmut Bley, Karin Hausen, Horst Gründer and Trutz v. Trotha – have
increasingly been filled by the recent boom in the field of colonial history in
German academia (and beyond). During the last ten years, numerous books and
articles have contributed to a better understanding of German colonialism ‘on the
ground’; in addition, German colonial fantasies, desires, failures and limitations
have also been under heightened scrutiny in recent times, and it is upon this base
that this article will build.
REGULATING COLONIAL POLICING
The administrative framework and police personnel in GSWA
When Europeans began to colonise the African continent, they had little to no
concept of how to achieve this objective. Knowledge about the areas to be colonized
was lacking. Besides knowledge, infrastructural and financial means were also
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lacking, as well as personnel and the appropriate equipment with which to enter the
unknown territories. Colonial administrators were forced to resort to policies of
‘trial and error’ in order to implement their self-imposed benchmark of (rudimen-
tary) statehood. The development of German colonial law, starting in 1886, was cer-
tainly no exception to this ‘trial and error’ approach10.
The legal arrangements of colonial rule were necessary in order to meet the
requirements of international and German constitutional law. Budgets had to be
approved; officials were to be sent to the colonies; civil and penal jurisdictions had
to be stipulated, as well as other competences. The Colonial Law (Schutzgebietsge-
setz), passed by the parliament in 1886, was to form the legal foundation for an ever-
growing realm of ordinances and some formal laws until 1918. The Colonial Law
declared the Emperor to be the bearer of the state authority (Schutzgewalt) on behalf
of the Reich. The definition of Schutzgewalt became highly contested by legal schol-
ars in Imperial Germany, but generally it was accepted to mean the authority to gov-
ern the overseas territories. The Emperor was also entitled to delegate his power to
the chancellor, who thereby became the “colonial minister”. European contempo-
raries saw the development of a colonial administration as a stepping-stone towards
the goal of establishing a ‘state’ inside a territory that was defined – according to
international law – as terra nullius. The situation discovered in the colonies was
– from a contemporary point of view – in need of a ‘cultural’ reconfiguration11.
German legal provisions therefore had to be implemented in the colonies. The
administration in Berlin ruled the colonies by ordinances, with the express desire of
keeping parliament and its laws out of administering the colonies as far as possible12.
More and more ordinances – specifically meant to meet the requirements of ruling a
colony – were passed, starting with provisions against the sale of alcohol and
weapons. The initial ‘trial and error’ policy of early colonial rule was replaced by a
more stringent (legal) grip on colonial assets after 1900. The number of regulations
continued to grow constantly, finally filling more than 13 volumes13.
The Kaiserliche berittene Landespolizei für Deutsch-Südwestafrika (Imperial
mounted police force in GSWA) was a police institution militarily organized and
trained, but administered by the civil administration. Its members were civil ser-
vants rather than soldiers. The head of the police inspectorate in Windhoek, how-
ever, was a Major or Lieutenant-Colonel delegated to serve in the civil colonial
administration, and under the colonial governor. Given that questions relating to the
subordination of military personnel under civil rule were of utmost importance to
German contemporaries, it is remarkable that in German colonies (except for the
naval base Tsingtao) the civilian governor headed not only the administration (Gou-
vernement), but was also superior to the commander of the military (Schutztruppe),
as well as to the head of the police inspectorate (Inspektion der Landespolizei)14.
After several previous attempts with civil policing, a police force in GSWA, dis-
tinct from the military, was formally founded in 1905. Based on plans made in 1903,
and being founded during the wars against Ovaherero and Nama, this new police
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force was initially not to play a role in GWSA. As in previous years, the military
continued to execute most of the police work; it would not be until 1907, following
the formal introduction of the Emperor’s organisational ordinance, that the business
of recruiting and actual police work would begin. The missions and duties of the
colonial police force were to be similar to its law enforcing counterparts in Ger-
many: securing public order, protecting the public’s welfare, and penalising perpe-
trators. In addition to these tasks, colonial police officers had to execute the so-
called “native regulations” of 1907, which regulated the carrying of official passes
by Africans, as well as their obligation to work and to be registered with the local
administration; stipulations similar to those found in the neighbouring Cape Colony
and Transvaal.
As stated above, the police inspectorate was a division within the governorate
(Gouvernement) of GSWA, which was in turn subordinate to the Imperial Colonial
Office (Reichskolonialamt) in Berlin. The police force was to comprise around 500
former non-commissioned officers (the military imprint of police officers was com-
mon in Imperial Germany, and in this case it was required that the prospective police
officers had served in the colonial forces or German army for at least six years) and
370 African “police servants” (Polizeidiener). These policemen would be deployed in
up to 110 police stations within, and at the fringes of, an established “police zone”.
This “police zone” was an area within GSWA (around 60% of the territory, excluding
the northern periphery of the colony as well as parts of the Kalahari and Namib desert)
where European settlers were allowed to own land. With the German parliament pass-
ing cutbacks in colonial budgets, the intended expansion of colonial police capacity
would be hindered: of the 720 German police sergeants planned for 1907, barely 450
could be actually budgeted for in 1913 (next to approximately 1,900 soldiers).
Despite continuous pressure on its budget, the above force would have to police
the roughly 14,000 European settlers, mostly of German origin, that lived within
GSWA by 1913. The precise number of Africans within the “police zone” of GSWA
is hard to estimate. There are no exact population figures available from before the
German wars against Ovaherero and Nama (1904-07), which, according to assessment
of some researchers, annihilated more than 50% of the respective populations15.
Also contemporary figures from after the war are unreliable – the 1908 estimate of
Vice-governor Oskar Hintrager, who claimed that “the entire coloured population”
of Africans within the “police zone” stood at 59,214 people, being a pertinent exam-
ple16. After all, who would have counted the population in this barren, often desert-
like territory, larger in size than Germany ? This figure can only be treated as an
approximate value at best, and owes much more to a colonial fantasy of omnipo-
tence than any real systematic study. Nevertheless, GSWA was still the largest set-
tler community of all German overseas possessions; despite this fact, the economic
expectations of most individual settlers, as well as the demographic hopes of policy
makers and colonial enthusiasts, would be disappointed.
Effectiveness and/or impotence of German colonial rule in GSWA
The above quoted numbers can only serve to question the effectiveness of
colonial rule, which was – especially outside the very small colonial ‘towns’ –
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represented most of all by military personnel or policemen ‘on the beat’. Any com-
parison between what was intended and what was executed emphasizes the deficits
and limits of colonial rule, and also often the impotence and inability to rule the
areas meant to be colonized. It was in this context that Jeffrey Herbst pointed to the
“schizophrenic nature of colonial power in Africa”: despite their brute force, colo-
nial coercive powers were regularly unable to enforce colonial rule ‘always and
everywhere’ within their colonial territories17.
As is true with colonial historiography in general, “a new generation of histori-
ans of colonial Namibia” also tend to question the “colonial hegemony”18. Indeed,
questions on the weakness of the colonial state have been repeatedly posed, espe-
cially when looking at the colonial spaces: where and when was the colonial state
actually present19? Considering the huge territories to be colonized, territories in
which the colonial state was barely present, and particularly in view of the meagre
colonial budgets and strategies of those who were being colonized, some historians
have characterized colonial rule as a form of “weak” or “embryo government”. This
“impotent”20 colonial state has also been characterized (in its German version of
GSWA) as a “pre-fascist” institution however21, which attempted the “total” sur-
veillance of its colonised subjects, and was thus a forerunner to the practices of Nazi
rule. The alleged “extreme nature of German colonial repression in Namibia”22 is
referenced by the ideology and brutality of the German officials, as well as by the
fatal results for both those Africans who rebelled, and more generally those who
came into contact with the colonial state23.
Even when taking the undisputed brutality of the colonial state into account (the
specificity or “extreme nature” of the German case has not yet been proven24), one
still cannot ignore the fact that colonial officials were unsuccessful in their attempts
to establish “peace and (public) order” in large tracts of their colonial territories. As
L. Gann and Peter Duignan stated decades ago: “A totalitarian state requires a coer-
cive state machine much more extensive and elaborate than that available to any
colonial power in Africa.”25 Colonial power was specifically located – and limited –
to a few places: colonial towns, police stations, and military outposts. The colonial
state can thus be seen to have consisted of little more than a loosely connected “‘rag
rug’ of islands of colonial power”26, their connection to each other coming in the
form of weekly or monthly patrols.
The colonial state at least attempted to be ‘on the spot’. The demonstration of
colonial presence was as much a problem as it was a task for colonial officials. The
head of the Windhoek district stated in 1908 that his policemen’s “main tasks con-
sist of riding patrols, in order to remind the natives of the presence of armed forces
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and to provide protection to the surrounding farmers”27. It was clear to the supervi-
sor just to what extent his policemen were able to exert influence over the “natives”;
as Richard Roberts has remarked, “Colonial officials were usually keenly aware of
the weakness of their own authority”28.
Until well into the 20th century, European powers only insufficiently managed to
secure ‘their’ colonial stakes. It is therefore correct to characterize – according to the
self-imposed benchmark of European statehood – colonial governments, and their
rule, as “weak” – a limitation that did not preclude the use of brutality however29.
The example of the German police force in GSWA supports this assumption. For 25
years (1890-1915), public security forces attempted to bring the territory under Ger-
man control ; for 25 years, pretence and reality diverged. As the above-quoted gen-
eral assessment of colonial “embryo” or “weak government”30 shows, this was in no
way a German particularity. The British colonial administrators in Africa consti-
tuted little more than a “thin white line”, and the same is true for their German coun-
terparts31. The Governor of GSWA, Theodor Leutwein, remarked that “the nomi-
nally existing German rule in the colony was not noticeable until 1891”32. Even the
German colonial encyclopaedia stated that “only since 1907 one can speak of actual
German rule” in GSWA33.
Nevertheless, pretence and reality would diverge later on. Some contemporaries
of the post Herero- and Nama-Wars characterized GSWA as, according to European
patterns, “completely pacified”, and in a “state of order”34. The police files of the
authorities in Windhoek suggest otherwise. The administration attempted to provide
‘safety’ for European settlers only inside the “police zone”; even there, however,
“rustlers” and “robbers” continued to cause trouble. Many regulations were stipu-
lated by the administration, but their enforcement was often impossible. Policemen
regularly reported to their superiors about these challenges, declaring for example
that tax collections in African settlements (cerft) were “unenforceable”35. Beyond
the “police zone”, in the so-called Caprivi-strip or in Ovamboland, the colonial state
admittedly did not even exert any control over the territory, which nominally
belonged to GSWA36.
African colonial personnel
Colonial administrators in Windhoek were familiar with their “weakness” in the
field. In order to achieve their aim of creating a state according to European patterns,
and to satisfy the necessity of ensuring order and security for any settlers, these colo-
nial administrators required adequate and sufficient security personnel. With the
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urgent need for forces familiar with the colony’s territory, and considering the lim-
ited funds available, the colonial administration resorted early on to recruiting
Africans. As the inspector of the colonial police, Heinrich Bethe, would later state,
their involvement in the formation and up-keep of the colonial state would be “indis-
pensable”37.
Without African policemen, police-work in the colony would have been impos-
sible; without the assistance and cooperation of African personnel, the colony could
not have functioned in the way it did. Irrespective of whether or not one wants to call
their practice “collaboration”, it needs to be emphasized that in GSWA the adminis-
trators were just as dependent on their African workers, interpreters and “servants”
as their French or British counterparts38. African policemen were crucial in coping
with the every-day police-work in the colony, a fact that was recognized by contem-
poraries: after all, local Africans knew the colony’s terrain. They also spoke the lan-
guages of the colony’s inhabitants, and were much cheaper than German service-
men. To characterize – or denigrate – these African colonial personnel as
“collaborators” may suit an attitude of enmity, as it can be described in the context
of European occupation regimes. To use such terminology in the context of late 19th
to early 20th century colonial regimes, however, is to ignore the variety of motives
that African men had to join the colonial forces39.
The early colonial state of GSWA could, and did, count on the cooperation of
African men in joining the police and military services. The payment these men
received was often better than what farm workers or servants of tradesmen could
expect, and they also benefitted from the high social esteem of uniformed men
amongst the African communities. Such was their motivation that these men were
employed in gunfights ; after skirmishes with smugglers, the chief of the border-
posts along the Orange River stated in 1897 that he could, “with regard to the native
policemen, report only favorably”40. He was not alone in this : the 1898 annual
report of Angelo Golinelli, the border-post chief’s superior and head of the southern
district (a man who would also go on to become a high-ranking official in the Impe-
rial colonial office), spoke highly of the 38 men in his “native police-corps”. Most
of these “brave men” of Namaland had served him for more than two years
already41.
After the wars against the Ovaherero and Nama (1904-07), “native policemen”
were called “police servants”, with the ranks of “police sergeant” and “constable”
being reserved for Germans. Technically, this distinction was an indicator that the
importance of the “police servants”, who had no authority towards Europeans, was
intended to be curtailed. The situation on the ground, however, remained
unchanged. The colonial state was unable to renounce their work: “police servants”
still being allowed to carry weapons and ride horses. It was even possible to assign
“police servants” to independent patrols against “robbers”, without the command of
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a German policeman42, since “whites” were considered unable to track “native crim-
inals” as African personnel could do43. In addition to employing “police servants”,
the colonial administration also deemed it necessary to enlist other Africans for
more short-term uses, such as specific patrols. These temporary recruits were paid,
or rewarded ‘in kind’, once a specific wanted “criminal” had been apprehended44.
One final example, relating to the German Colonial Office’s 1914 ban on inde-
pendent “native patrols” in German-East-Africa and the Cameroons, underlines
many of the issues explored in both this and the previous section. Upon learning of
the ban, the then governor of GSWA, Theodor Seitz, urged the colonial secretary to
continue to approve the independent deployment of “police servants” in his territory.
At the same time, Seitz warned his regional administrators that Berlin wished to
curb the use of independent “native patrols”45. Such actions indicate that, based on
their everyday experience, colonial officials presumed the indispensability of
African personnel in maintaining colonial rule, and that it would prove too difficult
to succeed without them. This example also points, once again, to a general problem
experienced by colonial administrators. The regulations and ordinances originating
in Berlin or Windhoek were often “unenforceable” in the huge swathes of colonial
territory; this ‘unenforceability’ being due to a combination of a lack of resources,
funds, personnel and knowledge – as well as due to the indignation of Africans who
were simply assumed to be the passive receivers of orders. The African population’s
notion of colonial (police) power was also often shaped by such limitations,
limitations that could barely be overlooked by either coloniser or colonised. The
inalienability of African (police) personnel proved to contemporaries the limited
power of the colonial state.
COLONIAL POLICING PRACTICES
Impoverishment, and the “problem” of “robbers”
and police patrols
The targeting of “robbers” and “rustlers” by police patrols, as well as by other
measures, certainly point to the most pressing security issue for the administration
in GSWA. The cause of such criminal behaviour, however, was largely unrecognized
by both colonial administrators and settlers : the impoverishment of the African
population through war and expropriations. Cattle and other valuables were lost or
confiscated, and other means of income were often insufficient to make a living46.
Such conscious acceptance of the pauperisation of the majority of Africans in
GSWA was a grave burden on the colony’s security situation: colonial police work
proved this fact on a daily basis.
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In sections of the territory that would later become GSWA, the stealing of cattle
had been a constant feature of 19th century economic and political life47. Despite the
advent of the colonial administration in the 1880’s and 1890’s, this facet of local life
would continue largely unchecked, as Governor Leutwein deplored in 190148.
Indeed, even after the wars of 1904-07, the intended European standards of “peace
and order” still did not prevail everywhere. The colonial state was forced to con-
stantly send patrols across (at least) the “police zone”, in order to “remind” Africans
of its presence.
In part the colonial state helped create the problems it was unable to solve. After
the wars, many Africans were forced to work on farms: the governor granting few
exceptions to a general prohibition on Africans keeping their own cattle. The farm
work upon which they were thus forced to rely was often inadequately paid, with
forms of payment in kind still proving insufficient to sustain the livelihood of a
worker and his family. Some colonial administrators were aware of this situation.
An official deplored the meagre daily ration of a farm worker: “one can of maize,
barely 3/4 pound, is not enough for a native who works all day long, in particular as
he does not receive meat, milk or fat”49. Understandably, workers were forced to
supplement their food by various means: by ‘poaching’, theft, the poisoning of live-
stock, scavenging for carrion, or by gathering. As the historian H. Bley has stated,
“[t]he Africans were always ready to escape into the bush [...] since they might as
well starve there as in European employ”50. An official remarked that “most of the
theft of livestock is committed by keepers of the stock”51. A connection between the
poor living conditions endured by workers, including their brutal treatment by farm-
ers, and their subsequent engaging in “criminal behaviour” like cattle theft, or the
formation of “robber gangs”, was thus comprehensible.
Once a cattle theft or other form of “banditry” was reported to the nearest police
station, patrols of up to ten men or more would attempt to follow the tracks. If the
police were unable to track larger groups of “bandits”, or could not dare to engage
them point-blank, the military was called in for assistance. As a result, heavy criti-
cism of the police and their perceived ‘inefficiency’ was rampant in the colonial
press52. With the police seemingly unfit to solve the problem, 1912 saw the gover-
nor of GSWA decide to further militarise the fight against such criminal behaviour:
in future, cases of “banditry” were to be referred directly to the nearest military
authorities by the local civil administration53. Not all local administrators would fol-
low this requirement though, as some were hesitant to take responsibility for having
engaged the military54; nevertheless, the brutal actions of the police and their
German and African volunteers, as well as the military, are still evident in the colo-
nial police files regarding patrols against such “robbers”.
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These acts of brutality can, in some way, be understood. Similar to the behaviour
that Alf Lüdtke describes the Prussian authorities displayed towards their subjects
during the “Vormärz” (the eve of the 1848 German revolution), the colonial state
and its authorities considered themselves to be permanently besieged by insurgency
and revolt. As a result, the colonial authorities regarded brute force against (poten-
tial) insurgents as both ‘necessary’ and ‘justifiable’55. Similar to practices in Ger-
many during strikes and other forms of civil unrest, the colonial military remained
the last resort for the governorate to ensure internal peace56. The distinction between
military and police tasks in GSWA was far less clear ; a situation similar to those
found in British colonial institutions of the time57. This problem was reflected in the
German colonial military law of 1896, which referred the maintenance “of public
order and security” (i.e. police tasks) to the military58. Since colonial police and mil-
itary forces were fulfilling similar functions in maintaining internal security, the
colonial administrators of GSWA began to discuss a potential merger of the two
security institutions in 1909; an initiative largely intended as a cost cutting measure.
However, no decision on the creation of a “Gendarmerie” would be reached until
1915.
The fear of “banditry” and riots thus remained a constant feature of the colonial
administration. The slightest ‘sign’ of “insubordination” had to be recorded. Even
correspondence of Africans could be controlled59; another example which displays
how precarious colonial administrators considered the status quo of “public order
and security” in GSWA.
Police and the “native regulations”
With violence and the pauperisation of the African population, the relation
between Africans and GSWA’s settler society, including its police force, is to be con-
sidered here. Accounts by the affected individuals, i.e. the colony’s African popula-
tion, are almost none existent : sources of African origin have barely found their way
into (colonial) archives, and the historiographical tool of oral history is barely avail-
able after the passage of 100 years60. Those individual accounts that did find their
way into the sources, however, suggest that fear of the police prevailed. Indeed, the
view held by senior police officials that the “main task” of GSWA’s policemen was
“to control and oversee the natives”61 became a defining aspect of the relations
between the colony’s police force and its African population.
Shortly after the state of war in GSWA ended on March 31, 1907, three so-called
“native regulations” were issued. Regarding the ‘control of Africans’, the ‘carrying
of (official) passes’ and also the ‘labour contracts’ between Africans and Europeans,
the purpose of these regulations was, according to some scholarship, the “total
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control” of African societies62. The use of such terminology in a colonial context
evokes a comparison with the totalitarianism of later regimes. Although some histo-
rians certainly describe a path “from Africa to Auschwitz”63, others, also with a view
on the colonial “weakness” ‘in the field’, state “that the significance of colonialism
for the phenomenon of National Socialist tyranny [does] not deserve such heavy
emphasis”64. Indeed, such ‘comparisons’ (if not equations) serve more to conceal,
rather than analyse, the actual power and assertiveness of the colonial state before
World War I.
This statement is not meant to dispute the fact that these regulations deeply
affected the every-day life of Africans in GSWA however. They limited both free-
dom of movement and choices of employment. By almost prohibiting the ownership
of cattle, they hindered the economic development of Africans and also served to
destroy a cultural foundation of the Ovaherero. The colonial state also pretended to
be able to control their entering into voluntary labour contracts with Europeans, as
well as the movement of Africans. Section 9 of the “control regulation” stipulated
that Africans had to live in specific, and police supervised, “native compounds”
(Werften). Governor Friedrich v. Lindequist would set out the principles regarding
the execution of this regulation, emphasising that “any interference in internal
affairs and disputes, in domestic family- and civil law shall be avoided, unless the
natives themselves ask for a decision”65. Giving advice to the effect that local prob-
lems should be left to the “natives” was common practise among the colonial admin-
istrators of all empires. This principle of “non-interference” was not only based on
convenience and practicability, but also on the confession that “officials did not
fully control or understand the conflicts and contests that took place within their
colonial empires”66.
The implementation and control of these three “native regulations” was, mainly,
left to policemen. They experienced problems in executing the (few) rights that
Africans did have under these new regulations, often finding them to be unenforce-
able. Unsurprisingly, conflict, fear and punishment came to dominate the relations
between Africans and police personnel, known as “opolisei” in Otjiherero67. As a
Herero-woman from Karibib would complain in a letter : “At our place the police are
very vicious”68. In view of this hostile perception, the head of the regional adminis-
tration of Omaruru gave a frank assessment of the relations between Africans and
policemen: “Most often the native learns about the police only as a punishing
authority, and therefore he does not properly trust it”69. In GSWA, the African pop-
ulation’s negative stance towards Germans was largely informed by their experience
of the wars (1904-1907), as well as the brutal treatment continually meted out to
them by their employers. As banditry and other forms of unruliness proved, many
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Africans did not readily accept the German claim to power. Colonial administrators
were thus all too well aware of the fragility of their ruling structure, and conse-
quently permanently feared potential uprisings. Provocations were to be avoided.
All colonial officials were, by internal rules, obliged to have a “good relationship”
with Africans. Indeed, it was considered a “prerequisite that the native [be] treated
benevolently and with self-restraint”, and that “attacks and unjustified roughness,
which are often based only on ignorance of the language and customs of the natives,
[should] be avoided at all costs”70. The following chapter will examine the attempts
at resolving this ignorance, as well as the wider questions of communication and
language that leading colonial officials correctly ascertained to be central to the
upholding of colonial rule.
LANGUAGES USED BETWEEN AFRICANS
AND GERMAN POLICEMEN
Colonial encounters were not first and foremost a matter of physical violence –
colonial military means were simply too weak for this. Negotiations regarding the
balances of power were far more common, often with both sides harbouring funda-
mental misconceptions of the other : in the context of GSWA, pertinent examples
being provided by the ‘negotiations’ relating to the “protection treaties” of the
1880s, as well as the subsequent ‘signing’ of these agreements by “crosses”.
Although sign language and interpreters necessarily represented the first elements
of such encounters, other kinds of non-verbal communication could also be
employed. Either by theatrical poses in splendid uniforms or the presentation of
European (arms) technology in intimidating ways, the message of ‘white
supremacy’ and colonial order could be communicated by a number of means71.
These means would reach their limits in colonial everyday life. Even after 1900,
when the power to exert control over people and land in GSWA was passing more
and more to the Germans, language(s) remained a ‘front’ that could still be used by
Africans to defend and promote their own interests. Indeed, languages remained a
place of retreat for African societies, a place not easily conquerable by colonisers.
To try to contain this ‘space’, the colonial authorities of GSWA employed two meth-
ods, the first of which being to school African interpreters in German. Known as
“German for Africans”, this step was to remain controversial among colonizers,
some of whom fearing that ‘civilization’ might have some kind of ‘distorting influ-
ence’ on Africans72. The second method, aimed at reducing the colonial state’s lin-
guistic dependency on Africans, was to encourage German colonists to learn an
African language. Although some colonists did indeed try to do this, both their
undertaking and their methods have been paid little attention by researchers. As a
result, the following chapter can only serve as a cursory approach to the topic.
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The inadequacy of interpreters for colonial purposes
and the necessity of African language skills
Decades before a German administration was established in the area, the mis-
sionary Carl Hugo Hahn warned his brethren about the use of interpreters. Demand-
ing that other missionaries learnt African languages, Hahn spoke of African lan-
guages as a “giant” that was “to be mastered”73. Although mastering the “giants”
was never a prerequisite for employment in the German colonial service, officials in
both Berlin and GSWA recognized the advantages that in-depth language knowl-
edge, and thus the information and decisions that could be arrived at as a result of it,
had to offer. The German Colonial Society (Deutsche Kolonialgesellschaft – DKG)
was convinced that “all reasoning argues against the constant employment of often
evil-minded and, more often [...,] unreliable mediators”, desiring instead for colo-
nial officials to be able to communicate directly as soon as possible74. Having
expressed a similar view a few years earlier75, Colonial Director Paul Kayser even
intended to offer rewards to those who learnt “native languages”. Indeed, the DKG
explicitly pointed to the experience of the head of administration in GSWA, Curt
v. Francois, who had stated that officials could only ensure they weren’t being
tricked by “native chiefs” through a good command of their language76.
When asked for his opinion on the language skills of his officials in 1896, the
head of the Windhoek district, v. Lindequist, stated that “the learning of native lan-
guages is very important for public servants and officers”. He welcomed good
knowledge of the “Dutch dialect”, i.e. Cape-Dutch (a language also used for corre-
spondence), and claimed that most of his officials had already learnt to write and
speak in this language77. Its usefulness, in comparison to the difficult
Nama/Damara-language, was clear – as Lindequist’s colleague in Keetmanshoop,
Gustav Duft, emphasized: “there is barely a werft in Namaland where one is not able
to communicate in [Cape-] Dutch”78.
Irrespective of such flattering assessment: The denser the colonial administra-
tion became, the more the lacking foreign language skills of both Europeans and
Africans became evident. The linguistic ignorance of colonial officials was com-
pounded by the fact that most of their translators were judged to have inadequate
knowledge of the language they were translating. This issue became a hindrance of
growing importance79 and the colonial language problems did not go unnoticed in
the parliament, or in the higher echelons of the colonial administration. Pointing to
the lack of language skills, in 1906 the representative Schwarze demanded: “that
[…] [colonial] officials […] must learn the native language. It is a major shortcom-
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ing of our [colonial] officials that they are unable to communicate directly with the
people, but instead rely on interpreters”80. By this point, it had been over ten years
since Colonial Director Paul Kayser and others had first emphasised the importance
of language skills for colonial officials, a period of time that had seen the situation
barely improve. As can be seen from an internal memorandum of 1911, future
progress on this matter would continue to be slow. The author of the memorandum,
Vice-governor of GSWA Oskar Hintrager, disapproved of the lacking language
skills of his German and African colonial personnel. He considered the lack of qual-
ified interpreters a serious setback for the “orderly [running of the] native judicial
system”, asserting that the “words of the official as well as of the natives are often
disfigured by the interpreter”. Demanding that this be remedied by increasing the
German language instruction that African children received in missionary schools,
Hintrager also expected that German officials in GSWA “pay particular attention to
the learning of native languages”81.
Despite Hintrager’s unambiguous words, Governor Theodor Seitz would also
find himself dissatisfied with the handling of the “native judicial system” two years
later. After having read some “criminal files”, Seitz had learnt, “with regret”, that
the “interrogations of natives [by German policemen]… have been executed in a
mostly insufficient manner”. This had even happened in cases involving the death
penalty. Similarly to Hintrager, the Governor deemed the inadequacy of interpreters
to be the main difficulty for the administration of the “native judicial system”. Seitz
condemned the common practice of, on a “case-by-case basis”, calling in “a native”
(usually an African policeman) whose language skills had never been examined to
serve as an interpreter : “no official can hold responsible office of a native-judge
without being able to communicate flawlessly with the native”82.
According to these sources, communication problems prevailed in the interac-
tions between the colonial officials of GSWA and the local African populace. There
was also, however, a recognizable policy that demanded colonial officials learn the
local African languages, indicating a preference for language learning by officials
over a continued reliance on African interpreters. This preference was based on sev-
eral insights. Most of the administrators had, at some point, experienced insuffi-
ciently skilled interpreters ; many of them arbitrarily summoned individuals. Colo-
nial administrators were aware of the uncertainty resulting from such practices, and
also knew that a ‘just native policy’ (as propagated by the colonial administration)
would not be achieved in this way. Moreover, it seemed to be only a matter of time
until a tragic occurrence, for instance a misjudgement based on incorrect transla-
tions, would become known to the wider public – something that may have led to
deleterious debates in parliament. Governor Seitz’s hints at the use of inadequate
translations in cases where the death penalty could have been imposed alluded to
this risk: this language policy was therefore also an expression of self-protection.
In addition to this, the strategic advantage offered by language knowledge must
also be taken into consideration. Similar to the situation in British colonies, where
the early 19th century policy of encouraging the native population to learn English
had already been abandoned, the administration of GSWA was faced with the
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question of whether the spread of the German language was useful or detrimental to
colonial purposes. Seemingly, there was a lot to be said in favour of avoiding any
such potential ‘risks’. The acknowledgement and appreciation of local elites, on the
basis of their good command of German, could have awakened “unfulfillable
wishes” among them83. Furthermore, the dependency on these elites as middlemen
between colonial administrators and ‘ordinary’ Africans was to be avoided, similar
to concerns in French Africa84. There was thus no other option but to develop the
competencies of German officials in African languages.
German officials as African language students
Admonitions to learn African languages reached policemen and other German
colonial officials from both Windhoek and Berlin. Demanding that his officials
acquire language skills was a principle of Colonial Secretary Wilhelm Solf, who had
earned a doctorate in oriental languages before studying law. During a visit to GSWA
in 1912, Solf encountered problems as a result of misunderstandings between him-
self and his African servant, commenting: “A true South-westerner would have
punched his face. I only concluded that the people here figure that the natives speak
German”. Solf expected better from his officials. As Paul Kayser had done twenty
years before, in April 1913 he reminded colonial officials to consider “the acquiring
of native languages to be among [their] duties”. The governor in Windhoek
responded that “until now[,] only very few officials [from the governorate] undertook
the efforts to learn a native language”85. Contrary to the officials in the governorate86,
policemen working in the stations and regional offices across GSWA were more open
to learning African languages. This is comprehensible; in their offices and ‘on the
beat’, direct contact and thus communication with the African populace was a daily
necessity. Indeed, policemen were well aware that having at least some language
skills was an indisputable advantage. Sergeant Rüdiger, after returning from a patrol
in Kaokoveld, indicated one of the possible benefits of learning a local language:
“the Ovatjimba are much more trusting if they encounter someone who speaks their
language”87. Furthermore, and contrary to the situation in colonial settlements like
Windhoek, missionaries capable of translating were generally unavailable either
during patrols or in most of the police stations in the farm areas. Understandably
then, section 24 of the “central internal regulation for policemen” stipulated that the
“learning of the natives’ language is very desirable. By exchanging their ideas with
each other, police officials will teach one another”88. The learning of African lan-
guages was, however, never a formal requirement for policemen. Material support
for those policemen making efforts to learn a local language, in the form of either
courses or teaching materials, was largely not forthcoming. Rather than supply these
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things, it was assumed by their superiors that policemen would simply recognize the
necessity of African language skills. At least in some instances, this assumption
would prove correct.
After the 1911 reminder of Vice-governor Hintrager that “officials [should] pay
particular attention to the learning of native languages”, the heads of GSWA’s
regional administrations were obliged to report on the capabilities of their staff.
From examining these reports, it becomes clear that some policemen had indeed
learnt a degree of their local African language, knowledge that could be useful in
communicating colonial order. Berengar v. Zastrow, head of the Grootfontein
district, stated that his policemen had attained sufficient knowledge of Otjiherero to
be able to “know the commonly used words”. Whereas some taunted the Nama/
Damara population for their “animal-like” clicking language89, the head of Gibeon
district named four policemen who “study the native [Nama/Damara] language”,
and pointed to the challenges of learning it without a teacher. His colleague from
Bethanien reported that his “constable knows a few words of Namaqua”, but was
forced to quit a language course run by a local missionary due to time constraints. In
addition, six policemen from Karibib had also tried to learn the Otjiherero or
Nama/Damara language. The head of Maltahöhe-district, Seydel, would in contrast
paint a somewhat less positive picture, commenting: “The few policemen in this
district have neither sufficient talent nor time to learn the Namaqua-language.” The
general busyness of policeman was also noted by several other regional administra-
tors, who claimed that, “due to a lack of time nobody was able yet to learn a native
language”90.
During their three-month leave to Germany, officials bound for the northern part
of GSWA were requested by the Colonial Office to study one of the Ovambo-
languages at the Seminar für Orientalische Sprachen in Berlin. This move was
supported by the governorate of GSWA, in particular for policemen on duty in
Okaukuejo, Outjo, Namutoni and the diamond fields near Lüderitzbucht, where
hundreds of Ovambo migrant workers lived. The policemen themselves also
responded with some enthusiasm – 1910 saw 16 policemen indicate their availabil-
ity for courses during their leave91. This interest would continue, even to the point
where the head of the Lüderitzbucht district requested, in 1914, that the governorate
finance a missionary-run Oshivambo course, for which “up to now 12 officials have
already registered”92. The results of such courses, or indeed those of other more
informal ways of learning, are difficult to assess however. In the early 20th century,
the European analysis and didactical preparation of African languages was still rudi-
mentary. The adequate translation of many terms remained “a difficult business,
especially since the Bantu languages [among them Otjiherero and Oshivambo] were
not nearly so simple as some claimed”93.
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Nevertheless, through the examination of sources compiled by policemen, it can
be assumed that communication with the African population was still possible. An
example of such communication is detailed by the inspection officer Hildebrand,
head of the police depot Waterberg, who explained in 1909 that : “From time to time,
the natives, passing Waterberg, are turning to the police office or to me in order to
receive news from family members”94. It was thus possible for Africans to contact
policemen directly, and for both sides to find the means to tolerably understand each
other – at least in some cases. According to Hans Rafalski, first assistant to the
police inspector in Windhoek, policemen were indeed able to just about communi-
cate in the native languages95. Furthermore, numerous communication exchanges
are detailed in the reports of patrolling policemen, and contain statements such as:
“according to the woman…”; (Weib) “… as has been confirmed to me by the
woman”; (Weib) and “The man told me…”96. Although discourse is evident, the
sources leave open the question as to what language was actually used in them:
whether during such encounters German prevailed over Otjiherero, Nama/Damara
or Oshivambo respectively, or indeed whether both sides used Cape-Dutch as their
preferred means of communication97.
Cape-Dutch was not only spoken by the Boer population of GSWA; it served as
the lingua franca in Nama- and Hereroland. Even if knowledge of the Otjiherero,
Nama/Damara or Oshivambo languages remained limited among policemen, many
of them were able to speak Cape-Dutch, which was easier to learn for Germans.
Vice-governor Hintrager spoke the language well98 (he had fought with the Boers in
the South African War), and over the years several policemen achieved similar lev-
els of fluency. Indeed, in the southern-most district of Warmbad, knowledge of
Cape-Dutch was considered a “necessity” for policemen. Wider concerns could still
temper its usage however: although the head of this district believed that all his
policemen could “speak the language well”, he feared for the “Germanness” of the
colony and so preemptively ordered his officials to communicate “with the Boers in
German”99.
Along with Cape-Dutch and other African languages, English also formed part
of the linguistic landscape of non-German languages that characterized GSWA;
similarly to Cape-Dutch, it had also been widespread in the area since pre-colonial
times. Despite their reservations about the influence of English, the German admin-
istration had to take into account the economic and political dominance of the Cape
Colony in southern Africa. As a result, English remained of importance in GSWA,
and certainly also for its policemen. Due to their close proximity to the border with
British-ruled Walvis Bay, 11 police sergeants stationed in Swakopmund requested
English lessons in 1907 – a request supported by their superior Hugo Blumhagen100.
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They were not alone: policemen in other areas of GSWA, such as Windhoek and
Bethanien in the colony’s south, would also receive tuition in English101.
Life in GSWA, with its mixture of cultures and languages (and where rudimen-
tary knowledge of at least some of these was a distinct advantage), therefore tended
towards the multilingual. As a result of this however, concerns arose in both Ger-
many and the colony regarding the “purity” of the German language there. Relating
to more general anxieties about the “Germanness” of Germans in GSWA, colonial
enthusiasts recognised an alleged “passive racial defilement” (“kaffrization”) of a
number of settlers : “similar to the English phrase ‘gone native’, evoke[ing] hapless
German men, sexually and symbolically contaminated by native women and culture”
– including the language102. Such discourses though, as well as the symbolic meaning
of the German language in the colonies, have already been repeatedly analysed by
historians103. When considering the fact that some contemporaries feared for the
“purity” of German culture and language in the colony, one should however not
ignore that the learning of African languages by officials – and in particular police-
men – was actively promoted by the German colonial administration.
Nevertheless, German colonial officials only enjoyed modest success in their
attempts to learn African languages, due in part to both the reluctance of individuals
and a lack of material support. Indeed, the level of proficiency that these men gained
in the various languages, with or without the aid of formal training, remains as yet
unknown. What is noteworthy, however, is that – according to their superiors –
around ten percent of colonial policemen occupied themselves with learning Nama,
Otjiherero, Oshindonga, Oshikuanjama and/or Cape-Dutch. Despite these efforts
though, the Cape-Dutch and German language skills of GSWA’s African population
remained predominantly important in facilitating communication between coloniz-
ers and the colonized; thus, despite all the criticism, African interpreters would still
remain indispensable for colonial purposes.
CONCLUSION
Looking at the short history of the colonial police force of GSWA (1894-1915),
it can be concluded that its creation (as a body distinct from the army) was most of
all a symbol of ‘normalisation’. GSWA was, after all, intended to become a settler
colony, similar to British South Africa; as a result, the growing number of settlers in
the colony could not be policed by the military, given the custom in Imperial Ger-
many to only use soldiers for police tasks during riots or other emergencies104. This
‘normalisation’ would not go as smoothly as desired however, being hampered by
both organisational and financial difficulties, as well as by the unruliness of both the
local African populace and the settlers themselves. Such difficulties also led
German contemporaries to constantly question the efficiency of the police force in
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GSWA, especially given the dissatisfying relation between the costs incurred and
the benefits gained. Amongst other issues, the police seemed unable to solve the
problem of “banditry”, as their continued calls for military assistance attested. Since
costs rose as a result, the German parliament insisted on further reductions to the
police. Indeed, the planned merger of the two colonial security institutions in 1915
was a logical conclusion, considering the similarity of their chief tasks: to control
– and subdue if necessary – the African population. Although the outbreak of World
War I prevented this institutional change, 1915 or 1916 may still have been the final
year of a distinct police force in GSWA, even without the South African conquest.
The attempts to ‘normalise’ the colonial state, according to European patterns, had
thus failed.
The involvement of African personnel in GSWA’s police force could not prevent
this failure. Nevertheless, Africans proved to be indispensable to the police through-
out the period of German colonial rule. Contrary to the wishes of some in the Ger-
man colonial administration, the German officials’ dependency on their skills and
knowledge could not be diminished – African policemen remained as much a part of
the German colonial state as they were in any other.
Knowledge of language was essential for colonial purposes, however for most of
the time only African interpreters had sufficient knowledge of all the languages
involved. Police practices (such as regulating, punishing, informing and recording)
were dependent, one way or another, on communication with the local population.
Likewise, German administrators were dependent on their African personnel in the
reverse direction: these “colonial rulers constantly [trying] to hear what their sub-
jects were saying through actions, words and symbols”105. Without Africans, and
their knowledge of the German language, they were unable to do so.
In the colonial context, the ability to speak and listen became increasingly
important as the regulatory framework developed and grew denser. Unsurprisingly,
colonial administrators considered their continued dependence on African inter-
preters as a defect in their otherwise supposedly constantly strengthened dominance
of the local population. Although the wider administration requested more German
officials learn an African language, these efforts showed only meagre results until
the end of German rule in GSWA. Policemen, regularly ‘on the beat’ and faced with
the difficulties of (mis)communication with the African populace, were understand-
ably more open to learning an African language than other administrators. No con-
certed policy was ever implemented in this regard however, and apart from the occa-
sional reminders of superiors to improve one’s language skills, most of the attempts
to do so were left to the colonial policemen’s own initiative.
The assumption of officials that “roughness [… is] often based only on igno-
rance of language and customs of the natives”106 suggests that it was recognized that,
by better understanding Africans, brutalities and other forms of conflict could have
been avoided. The question as to what policy for everyday colonial practices could
have resulted from such a recognition, however, does not necessarily lead to the
answer of a “more moderate approach”107 The incomprehensibility of their language
was one of the ‘retreat areas’ for Africans; had this area been ‘disclosed’, colonial
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administrators could have used it to further strengthen their regime. More research
is thus needed into not only the question of ‘what’ was spoken and listened to in
encounters between colonial policemen and the African population, but also ‘how’
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